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I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Fred C. Zacharias was a prolific scholar in the professional
responsibility field.1 At the close of each summer, I expected to receive

† The complete title and citation of the article is Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do
When Nobody’s Watching: Legal Advertising as a Case Study of the Impact of
Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L. REV. 971 (2002).
* Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law. I would like to thank
Art Garwin, Margery Koosed, and Joann Sahl for valuable comments on earlier drafts.
Thanks also to my research assistants, Stephanie Haight and Kelly Lipka, for their time
and valuable help.
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one or more new articles written by him, with a personal note requesting
comments about his work. It was always a humbling way to begin a
new school year because it often reminded me of my unfinished projects.
But, the more meaningful message for me was that here was a wellknown scholar in the professional responsibility field interested in my
thoughts. I often responded, in part, because Zacharias was a special
colleague. He supported my efforts as a new professor to teach and
write in the professional responsibility field. In subsequent years, we
became close colleagues.
I want to thank Professor Bruce Green for inviting me to contribute to
this publication honoring Zacharias by discussing one of Zacharias’s
articles.2 I immediately volunteered to comment upon What Lawyers Do
When Nobody’s Watching: Legal Advertising as a Case Study of the
Impact of Underenforced Professional Rules (Nobody’s Watching).3
Nobody’s Watching examines two topics of interest to me: the

1. The term professional responsibility for the purpose of this Article
encompasses a broad range of topics, including lawyer and judicial ethics, professional
discipline, lawyer malpractice, legal education and training, and the general study of the
legal and judicial professions. Zacharias has written on all of these topics. A recent
search of Professor Zacharias’s writings produced a long list of articles contained in
Appendix A, see infra Appendix, some of which, including this Article, are discussed in
a tribute to Zacharias in this issue, Memorial Issue, In Memoriam to Professor Fred C.
Zacharias, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1 (2011). Zacharias published at least one, often two,
and sometimes more, articles each year since 1988 with the lone exception of 1990. See
id. This is an extraordinary achievement for any author, and this figure does not take
into account that he authored numerous articles before he began his string of annual
publications in 1988—some twenty-two years ago. The following articles provide a
truncated picture of Zacharias’s long history of scholarship, in chronological order: Fred
C. Zacharias, Standing of Public Interest Litigating Groups To Sue on Behalf of Their
Members, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 453 (1977); Fred C. Zacharias, The Uses and Abuses of
Convictions Set Aside Under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 1981 DUKE L.J. 477;
Fred C. Zacharias, The Politics of Torts, 95 YALE L.J. 698 (1986); Fred C. Zacharias,
Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351 (1989); Fred C. Zacharias, Federalizing
Legal Ethics, 73 TEX. L. REV. 335 (1994) [hereinafter Zacharias, Federalizing Legal
Ethics]; Fred C. Zacharias, Forward: The Quest for a Perfect Code, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 787 (1998); Fred C. Zacharias, Waiving Conflicts of Interest, 108 YALE L.J. 407
(1998); Fred C. Zacharias, Understanding Recent Trends in Federal Regulation of
Lawyers, PROF. LAW., Symp. Issue, 2003 at 15; Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green,
Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 73 (2009); Fred C.
Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1147 (2009) [hereinafter
Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation]; Fred C. Zacharias, Steroids and Legal Ethics
Codes: Are Lawyers Rational Actors?, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671 (2010) [hereinafter
Zacharias, Steroids and Legal Ethics Codes].
2. Bruce Green is the Louis Stein Professor of Law and Director of the Louis
Stein Center for Law & Ethics at Fordham University School of Law. ASS’N OF AM.
LAW SCH., THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 2009–2010, at 707–08 (2010). He
is a well-known authority in the professional responsibility field.
3. See Zacharias, supra note †.
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profession’s advertising rules and lawyer discipline.4 These topics
obviously interested Zacharias, given his multiple works on lawyer
advertising and lawyer discipline.5 I also selected Nobody’s Watching
because a former colleague and I had considered writing about lawyer
advertisements in telephone books shortly before Zacharias’s work.6

4. In chronological order, see, for example, John P. Sahl, Secret Discipline in the
Federal Courts—Democratic Values and Judicial Integrity at Stake, 70 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 193 (1994), which discusses the disciplining of federal judges and argues for
greater transparency in the process; Jack P. Sahl, From Grievance and Complaint to
Sanction: Attorney Misconduct in Ohio, 23 U. D AYTON L. R EV . 303 (1998), which
examines Ohio cases applying the clear and convincing evidence standard for
sanctioning lawyers and suggests that the Ohio Supreme Court should better explain the
facts and reasoning it uses in disciplining lawyers to thereby promote public confidence
in the profession and its ability to self-regulate; John P. Sahl, The Public Hazard of
Lawyer Self-Regulation: Learning from Ohio’s Struggle To Reform Its Disciplinary
System, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 65 (1999), which evaluates Ohio’s lawyer discipline system
and recommends reforms; John Sahl, Helping Clients with Living Expenses: “No Good
Deed Goes Unpunished,” 13 PROF. LAW., no. 2, 2002 at 1, 4–13, which analyzes states’
ethics rules, disciplinary cases, and related policies barring lawyers from advancing
certain costs—the cost of medical care, rent, food, and other “humanitarian assistance”—
to clients; and argues that such assistance is a laudable goal for the bar and the public;
Jack P. Sahl, The Cost of Humanitarian Assistance: Ethical Rules and the First
Amendment, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 795 (2003) [hereinafter Sahl, The Cost of Humanitarian
Assistance], which reviews lawyer conduct codes and cases that prohibit lawyers from
advancing funds to indigent clients to cover certain costs, such as transportation and
housing expenses; and in states where humanitarian assistance is permitted, argues that
lawyers should be free to advertise such assistance under the First Amendment’s
commercial speech doctrine.
5. Some of Professor Zacharias’s writings on lawyer advertising and discipline
are as follows: Fred C. Zacharias, A Word of Caution for Lawyer Assistance Programming,
18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 237 (2004) [hereinafter Zacharias, A Word of Caution]; Fred C.
Zacharias, Effects of Reputation on the Legal Profession, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173
(2008); Fred C. Zacharias, Reform or Professional Responsibility as Usual: Whither the
Institutions of Regulation and Discipline?, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1505; Fred C. Zacharias,
The Fallacy that Attorney-Client Privilege Has Been Eroded: Ramifications and Lessons
for the Bar, PROF. LAW., Symp. Issue, 1999 at 39; Fred C. Zacharias, The Future
Structure and Regulation of Law Practice: Confronting Lies, Fictions, and False
Paradigms in Legal Ethics Regulation, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 829 (2002); Fred C. Zacharias,
The Legal Profession in the Year 2050, 15 WIDENER L.J. 253 (2006); Zacharias, The
Myth of Self-Regulation, supra note 1; Fred C. Zacharias, The Preemployment Ethical
Role of Lawyers: Are Lawyers Really Fiduciaries?, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 569 (2007);
Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675
(2003); Fred C. Zacharias, What Direction Should Legal Advertising Regulation Take?,
PROF. LAW., Symp. Issue, 2005 at 45.
6. The colleague, Professor William C. Becker, and I were examining lawyer
advertisements on the covers and spines of telephone books in addition to advertisements
in the yellow pages.
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Part II of this Article summarizes Nobody’s Watching. It also
examines some of the consequences of failing to enforce ethical rules for
lawyer conduct and offers some lessons for future rule development and
enforcement. Part III considers some of the academic and practical
significance of Nobody’s Watching. The Article concludes by noting
that Nobody’s Watching offers academics, lawyers, and regulators a
valuable tool to better understand and improve the regulation of the
profession.
II. NOBODY’S WATCHING: LAWYER ADVERTISING AND THE
YELLOW PAGES
A. Brief Summary
In Nobody’s Watching, Zacharias explores the “ramifications of
maintaining unenforced or underenforced rules” in lawyer codes of
professional conduct.7 He examines this multifaceted topic in the
particular context of lawyer advertising in the “yellow pages” of
telephone directories.
Zacharias begins the article by describing a hypothetical young solo
practitioner in San Diego who decides to advertise in the local yellow
pages.8 The lawyer researches the pertinent sections of the California
Rules of Professional Conduct.9 Then the lawyer peruses the yellow
7. Zacharias, supra note †, at 973. Zacharias uses the terms unenforced and
underenforced interchangeably. Id. at 973 n.1. These terms “refer to rules that either are
never enforced or are severely underenforced (as opposed to being selectively enforced
so as to deter violations thorough random prosecutions).” Id.
8. Id. at 973.
9. See CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-400 (1999). This rule was in effect
and provided, in part:
(D) A[n advertising] communication . . . shall not:
(1) Contain any untrue statement; or
(2) Contain any matter, or present or arrange any matter in a manner or
format which is false, deceptive, or which tends to confuse, deceive,
or mislead the public; or
(3) Omit to state any fact necessary to make the statements made, in
light of circumstances under which they are made, not misleading to
the public; or
....
(6) State that a member is a “certified specialist” unless the member
holds a current certificate as a specialist issued by the [California] Board
of Legal Specialization, or any other entity accredited by the State
Bar . . . and states the complete name of the entity which granted
certification.
CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-400(D). See also Zacharias, supra note †, at 976
(quoting CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-400(D)); id. at 975–76 (recognizing that
California significantly revised its advertising rule in 1988 and that the revised rule was
similar to the earlier rule adopted in 1979).
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pages to look for ideas in creating an advertisement. The lawyer is
surprised to see many violations of the California Rules of Professional
Conduct. Some advertisements are misleading and others identify
lawyers as specialists without referring to a certifying agency, as is
required by the rules.10 Some advertisements are anonymous and
approximately one out of every seven fails to identify a particular lawyer
responsible for the advertisement, again required by the rules.11 The
lawyer consults Westlaw and learns that there are only three reported
cases that resulted in lawyer discipline for advertising under the current
California advertising rules that had been in place for thirteen years.12
Two of the cases involved targeted solicitation by lawyers.13 The third
case concerned a lawyer’s “unintentional false statements in advertising
letters to present and former clients” and “constituted conduct ‘aggravating’
other code violations and therefore justified enhanced discipline.”14
Thus, the three cases involved more than simple advertising violations.
The young lawyer considered three possible explanations for the lack
of enforcement. “First, the advertising rules do not mean what they say.
Second, the advertising rules mean what they say, but are not enforceable.
Third, the rules mean what they say and are enforceable, but the
regulators do not deem violations important enough to prompt disciplinary
action.”15
In addressing these explanations and related concerns, Zacharias first
reviews California’s rules and standards regulating lawyer advertisements.
He then discusses his empirical research of the 1999–2000 “attorneys”
section of the yellow pages in San Diego and other major California
cities to assess lawyer compliance with the state’s advertising regulations.16
Zacharias concluded that San Diego lawyers “frequently violated” the
advertising rules and that if the lawyers had read the rules, they would
10. See CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-400(D)(6).
11. See id. R. 1-400 standard 12 (stating that an advertisement violates the rules if
it “does not state the name of the member responsible for the communication”).
12. Zacharias, supra note †, at 973. According to Professor Zacharias’s survey of
the yellow pages, 114 advertisements out of a total of 857—or 1 of every 7.41
advertisements—failed to identify a responsible lawyer. Id. at 978.
13. Id. at 973.
14. Id. at 973–74, 986–87 & n.75 (citing Gadda v. State Bar of Cal., 787 P.2d 95,
100 (Cal. 1990)).
15. Id. at 974.
16. Id. at 977 & n.18 (contending that San Diego’s experience is not unique based
on comparative data from San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Sacramento in their respective
yellow page advertisements for 2000–2001).
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have readily appreciated the impropriety of their conduct.17 He found
“835 discursive advertisements” in San Diego’s 110 pages of yellow
pages devoted to lawyer advertisements.18 At least 257 contained actual
or presumptive violations of ethics rules because they failed to identify a
lawyer responsible for the advertisement,19 made “misleading claim[s]
[of] ‘no recovery, no fee,’”20 or suggested improper “claims of special
expertise.”21 These were clear violations of unambiguous rules—requiring
no interpretation by Zacharias about the rules’ applicability.22
Other rule violations were not as obvious and Zacharias had to
interpret the applicability of the advertising rules to each advertisement.
Zacharias eliminated from his analysis those advertisements where a
reasonable argument could be advanced to support the inapplicability of
the rules—or stated differently, presumed the advertisement’s validity.23
The nonobvious violations ranged from misleading claims of prior
success24 and reliance on testimonials25 to implied “connection[s] with
governmental agencies or nonprofit legal service organizations.”26
17. Id. at 984.
18. Id. at 977.
19. Id. at 978 & nn.23–25, 979 n.26 (identifying 114 advertisements that failed to
include the name of a lawyer responsible for the communication, of which 60 were
anonymous); see CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-400 standard 12 (1999) (requiring
the identification of one lawyer in the firm responsible for the advertisement); Zacharias,
supra note †, at 978.
20. Zacharias, supra note †, at 979–80 & nn.27–30 (discerning that seventy-six
advertisements promised “no recovery, no fee,” that only two of these addressed
responsibility for costs, and that there were only two others that really focused on the
issue of costs); see CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-400 standard 14 (1999) (requiring
that the lawyers who use “no recovery, no fee” also disclose whether client is responsible
for costs).
21. Zacharias, supra note †, at 980–81 & nn.31–36 (observing that only 60 of 145
lawyer advertisements involving a claim of special expertise complied with California’s
ethics rules); see CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-400(D)(6) (1999) (requiring
lawyers, certified as specialists by the California Bar Association or another organization
approved by it, to identify the certifying entity’s complete name).
22. It is important to note that Zacharias found it unnecessary “to inquire into the
existence of the potentially biggest and most dangerous category of violations—
advertisements that are factually false or deceptive.” Zacharias, supra note †, at 984. A
significantly greater investment of time and other resources would be required to discern
factually false or deceptive advertisements. For example, Zacharias might have to
directly contact lawyers to check the factual accuracy of advertisements communicating
lawyers’ practice areas and years of practice.
23. Zacharias, supra note †, at 982.
24. Id. at 982–83 nn.37–45 (finding at least forty advertisements that violated the
California advertising rules by providing information about prior successes “without
stating that these statistics could not serve as a predictor of future results”); see CAL.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-400(D)(2) (1999) (prohibiting any advertisements that
contain information that is “false, deceptive, or which tends to confuse, deceive, or
mislead the public,” or that “present or arrange” information in such a manner).
25. See Zacharias, supra note †, at 983 & nn.46–53 (noting that a number of
advertisements seemed to violate the rule against testimonials by including various “titles or
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Zacharias’s research demonstrates that unethical lawyer advertising in
the yellow pages is a statewide problem of meaningful proportion. Yet
there are only three reported disciplinary cases in California involving
improper lawyer advertising in the thirteen-year period preceding the
1999–2000 yellow pages, and they involved lawyer solicitation rather
than “simple legal advertising.”27
Zacharias examined reported cases for lawyer advertising violations
from the five states, other than California, with the largest populations of
lawyers.28 These states—New York, Illinois, Texas, New Jersey, and
Florida—are all considered to be bellwether jurisdictions regarding the
legal profession’s state of affairs, and yet they yielded results similar to
California. Lawyer advertising proscriptions were underenforced or
simply not enforced.29
He also surveys the remaining forty-four jurisdictions and the District
of Columbia regarding the enforcement of advertising violations. The
findings for these remaining jurisdictions are consistent with the data
concerning California, New York, Illinois, Texas, New Jersey, and

awards,” for example “‘Best Advocate’”); see CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-400
standard 2 (1999) (stating that an advertisement that “contains testimonials about or
endorsements of a member” must also “contain[] an express disclaimer such as ‘this
testimonial or endorsement does not constitute a guarantee, warranty, or prediction regarding
the outcome of your legal matter’”).
26. Zacharias, supra note †, at 983–84; see id. at 984 nn.54–60 (identifying some
advertisements that appear to “skirt” the boundaries of the California ethics rules by
using names such as “‘Family Law Clinic of San Diego’”); CAL. RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1-400 standard 6 (1999) (prohibiting the use of “a firm name, trade name,
fictitious name, or other professional designation which states or implies a relationship
between any member in private practice and a government agency or instrumentality or a
public or non-profit legal services organization”).
27. Zacharias, supra note †, at 985–86 & n.65. Although not found in official
state, regional, or national reporters, Zacharias noted that there are several other disciplinary
actions against lawyers for violating advertising rules contained in “[a]bbreviated
announcements” in the California Bar Journal, the Los Angeles Daily Journal, and the
California Lawyer. Id. at 985–86 & n.66–73.
28. Id. at 988.
29. See id. at 988–91. Zacharias observes that “Florida is one of the few states that
aggressively continues to press the constitutionally permissible limits of advertising
regulation” and that the state reports the most disciplinary cases for lawyer advertising of
any jurisdiction: a total of only ten during the post-Bates period. Id. at 990–91; see infra
note 31. Only three of the forty-five jurisdictions reported as many as seven disciplinary
cases—the same number as Texas, which ranked second after Florida in that part of
Zacharias’s survey examining the five states other than California with the largest lawyer
populations. See Zacharias, supra note †, at 989, 991.
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Florida.30 “For the post-Bates period, the forty-five jurisdictions reported a
total of only sixty-six cases, or an average of 0.06 cases per state per
year,” and twenty of the jurisdictions did not report a single disciplinary
case involving advertising.31 The survey’s “statistics strongly suggest
that most jurisdictions share California’s tendency to overlook violations
of the [advertising] rules.”32
Zacharias observes that lawyer advertising rules are generally
“concrete,” informing both lawyers and regulators about the ethical
boundaries of permissible advertising.33 He also notes that many of San
Diego’s yellow-pages advertisements clearly violate the state’s advertising
rules.34 Thus, California’s lack of enforcement of its rules cannot be
explained away because of “vagueness in, or unenforceability of, the
rules.”35 Zacharias also effectively refutes any notion that lawyers are
unaware of the ethical significance of and professional risks associated
with improperly advertising in the yellow pages.36 As a result, he
contends that disciplinary authorities intentionally decide against
enforcing the advertising rules, prompting some lawyers to “flout[]” the
rules.37 Zacharias acknowledges that the large number of advertising
violations might also reflect the failure of lawyers to check or understand
the rules, although these are unlikely reasons for the numerous violations
and nonenforcement.38

30. Zacharias, supra note †, at 988.
31. Id. at 991–92. Perhaps more starkly stated: “[T]he forty-five jurisdictions have
reported an average of 1.5 cases every twenty-four years.” Id. at 992 n.101; see Bates v.
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
32. Zacharias, supra note †, at 994–95.
33. See id. at 995. For example, standard 12 of the California Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1-400 requires an advertising communication to “state the name of the
member responsible for the communication. When the communication is made on
behalf of a law firm, the communication shall state the name of at least one member
responsible for it.” Id. at 977 & n.17 (quoting CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-400
standard 12 (1999)). Standard 14 also provides that it is a violation for an advertising
“communication” to state or imply “‘no fee without recovery’ unless such communication
also expressly discloses whether or not the client will be liable for costs.” Id. (quoting
CAL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1-400 standard 14 (1999)).
34. Id. at 995.
35. Id.
36. See id. at 995–96 (commenting that news was widely disseminated concerning
recent United States Supreme Court jurisprudence broadening the scope of the
commercial speech doctrine to protect some lawyer advertising, and that some states had
recently revised their lawyer advertising rules). The topics of lawyer advertising and
discipline are also covered in the required law school professional responsibility or legal
ethics course, so reasonable lawyers would consult their jurisdiction’s advertising rules
like the “new lawyer” at the beginning of Nobody’s Watching. See id. at 973–74, 995–96.
37. Id. at 996.
38. See id.
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In examining possible reasons for the underenforcement of the
profession’s ethical rules, Zacharias explains that some rules are
underenforced because they are purely hortatory.39 These rules are
susceptible to several meanings and, therefore, are inhospitable to easy
interpretation and enforcement.40 He resorts to one of his more frequent
topics to provide an example—the professional responsibility and
regulation of prosecutors.41 Prosecutors have a duty to “do justice.”42
This mandate is susceptible to several reasonable interpretations and
complicates ready enforcement, especially from a regulator’s perspective
who may be confronting budgetary constraints and a high caseload.
Unlike hortatory rules, advertising rules provide “fairly distinct
commands” and generally involve transparent violations.43 It is also
unlikely that any other institution but the bar will enforce advertising
39. Id. 974, 997.
40. See Quintin Johnstone, Bar Associations: Policies and Performances, 15 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 193, 211–12 (1996) (“Questions have arisen in a host of situations as to
what the Rules [of Professional Conduct] . . . mean and how they should be applied. . . .
[I]t is a common practice for the professional ethics committees of bar associations to
give written interpretive opinions.”); see also Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Attorney’s Duty
To Report Professional Misconduct: A Roadmap for Reform, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
259, 273 (2003) (contending that the mandatory duty of lawyers to report professional
misconduct under ABA Model Rule 8.3 is ambiguous and may lead to underreporting
and that the lack of enforcement actions for nonreporting may reflect a conscious deterrence
strategy—perhaps we do not want lawyers reporting all the misconduct they observe).
41. Zacharias often wrote about prosecutorial ethics, as evidenced by the following
list: Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics, 55
VAND. L. REV. 381 (2002); Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys
Scandal” and the Allocation of Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187 (2008); Fred
C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121 (1998); Fred C.
Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the
Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223 (1993) [hereinafter
Zaharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes]; Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the
Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV.
45 (1991); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty To Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A
Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2009)
[hereinafter, Zacharias & Green, Duty To Avoid Wrongful Convictions]; Fred C.
Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721 (2001); Fred
C. Zacharias, The Role of Prosecutors in Serving Justice After Convictions, 58 VAND. L.
REV. 171 (2005); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal
Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207 (2000); Fred C. Zacharias, Who Can Best Regulate the
Ethics of Federal Prosecutors, or, Who Should Regulate the Regulators?: Response to
Little, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 429 (1996).
42. Zacharias, supra note †, at 998, 1013, 1014, 1018 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
43. Id. at 1002; see id. n.33 & accompanying text (providing examples of “distinct
commands”).

455

rules.44 Thus, any examination concerning the underenforcement of
ethics rules necessarily involves an examination of the bar.
Zacharias provides a helpful, global analytical framework for
conceptualizing professional regulation. One conceptualization is that
ethical codes primarily provide guidance to help lawyers avoid the
“pitfalls” of practice—the kind of conduct that results in sanctions
because it seriously offends the public or threatens the bar’s image.45
Under this view, regulators believe that the rules successfully serve their
guidance function if most lawyers follow the advertising rules without
full enforcement.
A second and perhaps more classic conceptualization is that ethical
rules are not intended merely to guide lawyer behavior but instead are
designed to compel certain conduct.46 For example, within this
conceptualization fall the admonitions about lawyers not making false
statements of fact or law to tribunals or engaging in ex parte contact with
opposing lawyers’ clients about the subject matter of the representation
without the opposing lawyers’ consent.47 Under both conceptualizations
—whether the rules are viewed primarily as serving a guidance function
or alternatively viewed as compelling specific conduct—the specter of
underenforcement and its effects exist.48
B. The Unintended Consequences of Underenforcement
The ramifications of the underenforcement of ethical rules fall into
four broad categories: (1) the effects on lawyers contemplating a
violation of an underenforced rule,49 (2) the effects on lawyers in
general,50 (3) the “[e]ffects on [c]lients and [o]bservers,”51 and (4) the
“[e]ffects on [r]ulemakers and [r]egulators.”52 Zacharias artfully weaves
the discussion concerning the first category with his quandary at the
44. For example, it is unlikely that lawyers in the state prosecutor or attorney
general offices will enforce lawyer-advertising rules.
45. Zacharias, supra note †, at 1003, 1005–06.
46. Id. at 1003–04.
47. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 (2010) (“Candor Toward the
Tribunal.”); id. R. 4.2 (“Communication With Person Represented by Counsel.”).
48. Zacharias notes that under the first conceptualization, where the rules serve a
guidance function, the rules may be successful as such “even without full enforcement.”
Zacharias, supra note †, at 1003. Moreover, even under the second conceptualization, which
forces lawyers to act in certain ways and warrants greater or full enforcement, Zacharias
concedes that there may be valid reasons for underenforcement. Id. For example, the
regulatory authorities may decide to spend their limited resources enforcing more serious
rule violations, such as lawyer theft of client funds. See id.
49. Id. at 1005–06.
50. Id. at 1006–07.
51. Id. at 1007–09.
52. Id. at 1009–12.
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beginning of the article of the hypothetical new lawyer who sees an
advertising landscape full of rule violations. According to Zacharias,
several consequences flow from this scenario for the new lawyer:
confusion regarding the meaning and significance of the rules and the
possible inference that other rules are also underenforced—undermining
her willingness to follow other rules and her faith in the value of
professional regulation.53 Worse yet, this scenario may cause the new
lawyer to question the basic role as a professional able to balance
personal interests with those of the public and the profession.54 The
ultimate effect of underenforcement is that the lawyer is likely to
question the rule’s importance and risk possible noncompliance.55
Underenforcement produces another effect. Not surprisingly, it
“breeds disrespect” among the bar for professional regulation.56 Why
follow the rules if there are no consequences?
Underenforcement also promotes stratification within the bar.57 Solo
practitioners and small firms often engage in yellow page, newspaper,
and other media advertising, whereas “elite” lawyers, often working in
large firms, compete on a different level.58 For example, elite attorneys

53. Id. at 1005.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1005–06.
56. Id. at 1006.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 1005–06. Zacharias notes that solo practitioners “are the main target
of discipline.” Id. at 1006 n.158 (citing Discipline: California Bar Report Finds Lack of
Bias Against Small Practices in Discipline Matters, 17 ABA/BNA LAW. MANUAL ON
PROF. CONDUCT 434, 435 (2001)). In a footnote, Zacharias quotes Professor Leslie C.
Levin, who writes that “‘talk’ of an ethical culture in small firm practice . . . stands in
contrast to reports by large law firm associates that those firms may not have distinctive
ethical cultures.” Id. at 1007 n.159 (quoting Leslie C. Levin, Preliminary Reflections on
the Professional Development of Solo and Small Firm Practitioners, 70 FORDHAM L.
REV. 847, 890 (2001)). See generally Brant T. Lee, The Network Economic Effects of
Whiteness, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1259, 1279–80 (2004).
Professor Brant T. Lee similarly writes about distinctive cultures, race, and competition in
the marketplace. He notes the following about the effect of race on networking:
Some kinds of employment might combine a direct or indirect communicative
effect with a stereotype communicative effect. Consider, for instance, the corporate
lawyer. Lawyers must communicate effectively with staff, with colleagues,
with their counterparts at other firms with whom they do business, with clients,
and with the clerks, judges and juries within the judicial system. They must
employ the direct language communication tools of prose, idiom, and metaphor.
They must also master the cultural references, such as conferences, drinks,
golf, and gender dynamics. The message that their race sends is unavoidable.
Id.
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rely on membership on charitable boards or corporate and other referral
networks to generate business. An unintended consequence of this
stratification is that large law firm lawyers may feel insulated from
professional regulation and conclude that such constraints only apply to
“lower order” lawyers.59 This kind of feeling and unconstrained conduct
corrodes lawyer morale and impedes the development of bar consensus.
It also poses a risk to consumer welfare if some lawyers feel that they
may deal with clients and others in ways unconstrained by professional
norms of behavior—essentially a belief that their conduct is beyond
reproach.
Another disturbing effect is that the public may believe that unethical
lawyer advertising represents the “ethos” of the profession and the
character or type of persons in the profession.60 The bar’s failure to
enforce advertising rules confirms the public’s worst suspicions about
the character of lawyers and the profession’s ability to self-regulate.61
Underenforcement undermines the notion that the profession is seriously
committed to high ethical standards—standards that are designed, in
part, to protect the public. Underenforcement also makes “[p]otential
clients . . . less willing to rely on the professional rules in forming
relationships with lawyers.”62 For example, the underenforcement of the
professional rules could lead potential clients to conclude that lawyers
will not protect client confidences, will not be held accountable for the
failure to protect these confidences, or both.63
Zacharias assumes that the bar has decided intentionally, and behind
closed doors, not to enforce the advertising rules.64 The lack of

59. Zacharias, supra note †, at 1006–07 (internal quotation marks omitted).
60. Id. at 1008. As Zacharias is apt to do in his scholarship, he is masterful in
highlighting his message with language, stories, and real cases that resonate with the
reader. He does exactly this with reference to a real case underscoring the potential harm
to the public’s perception about the kinds of persons who are lawyers. He cites an article
reporting that an admiralty lawyer in Hawaii “passed out packages of condoms with the
tag line ‘Saving Seamen the Old-Fashioned Way.’” Id. at 1008 n.163 (quoting Maria
Shao, Dial-a-Suit: Lawyers’ Battle over Advertising Heats up as Mass. Bar Jumps into
Fray, BOS. GLOBE, Oct. 10, 1995, at 37). Zacharias also cites to a book by William E.
Hornsby, which critically describes “a lawyer who drove a hearse with side panels that
carried the message ‘No-frills wills—10 bucks.’” Id. (quoting WILLIAM E. HORNSBY,
JR., MARKETING AND LEGAL ETHICS: THE BOUNDARIES OF PROMOTING LEGAL SERVICES
39 (3d ed. 2000)).
61. Zacharias, supra note †, at 1008.
62. Id. at 1009.
63. Id.; see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010) (“Confidentiality of
Information.”).
64. See Zacharias, supra note †, at 1009; see also Edward C. Brewer, III & Kelly
S. Wiley, Professional Responsibility, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 35, 51 (2002) (discussing the
Kentucky rule prohibiting “public claims to a ‘specialty’”). Brewer and Wiley state that
the Kentucky rule:
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transparency around that decision “reinforces the bar’s authority to
choose not to enforce other rules” and sets additional policy without an
open and democratic dialogue about the merits of such action.65 A
closed and secretive process for creating and enforcing regulatory
standards creates the risk of overlooking helpful information and of
delegitimizing the standards, if not the entire regulatory regime. Less
input from bar members in the creation and implementation of ethical
rules increases the likelihood that members will not feel invested in the
process or the governing ethical principles. For Zacharias, “[g]reater
transparency in agency decisionmaking could shed significant light on
the appropriateness, or inappropriateness, of a jurisdiction’s implementation
of the professional rules.”66
C. Underenforcing Ethics Rules—Some Lessons
Zacharias ultimately concludes that there are some important lessons
to be learned from California’s experience with regulating advertising.
First, California failed to “consider the multiple purposes of professional
regulation.”67 “Hortatory and guidance rules envision less enforcement
than rules that are designed to control behavior.”68 Rules that are
primarily designed for “public relations or image-enhancement may or
may not require a significant level of enforcement.”69
[S]hould be enforced, or . . . amended to permit advertisements of the sort
presented in the Yellow Pages. The current situation of a rule that apparently
is not enforced, but rather is widely violated, runs a risk of misleading lawyers
into a view that the advertising rules do not mean what they say, creating a
public perception that lawyers do not properly regulate their own profession,
and of contributing to erosion of respect for the rule of law.
Id.
65. Zacharias, supra note †, at 1009.
66. Id. at 1010. Zacharias recognizes that when the discretion to enforce a rule is
made behind closed doors, this creates de facto “second-line policymakers” who get to
determine what the rule means outside the public purview. Id. at 1011. Zacharias also
notes:
For example, the adoption of a strict rule forbidding lawyers ever to engage
in sexual relations with their clients may depend on an expectation that disciplinary
authorities will implement the rule only with respect to coercive conduct. This
tacit expectation has the dual effect of allowing rulemakers to adopt an
inartfully drafted provision and of shielding the second-level policy decision
from full and open debate.
Id. 1011–12 (footnotes omitted).
67. Id. at 1016.
68. Id. at 1015 (footnote omitted); see supra notes 39–45 and accompanying text.
69. Zacharias, supra note †, at 1015 (footnote omitted).
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Second, Zacharias concludes that underenforcement of the rules
undermines both the public’s and bar’s trust in the profession’s
commitment to high ethical standards and serious self-regulation.70 The
risk of undermining the public’s and bar’s trust occurs irrespective of the
particular rule’s purpose—the public expects enforcement.
Zacharias discerns several other lessons from his empirical work in
Nobody’s Watching. For example, he contends that some underenforcement
results from poorly drafted rules.71 The drafters have to more clearly
“identify[] the function, or functions, of each rule.”72 When the function
is “to guide rather than control behavior,” the drafters should
acknowledge the “unlikelihood of enforcement” and recognize that the
impetus for shaping lawyer conduct must then flow from the professional
standards themselves.73 Zacharias suggests that there may be a need for
“implementing information rules that educate lawyers and clients about
the force of the rules”—clearly outlining their mutual responsibilities
and discretion.74 The information rules would assist regulators in deciding
when a rule is intended primarily as a “guidance” standard where full
enforcement may be unnecessary.
Zacharias believes that some underenforcement occurs because of the
“unilateral policy choices” of disciplinary agencies.75 The disciplinary
authorities need to determine when their enforcement policies “effectively
change the substance or force of the rules,” reflect on whether this is
their choice to make, or determine if this should be a choice rulemakers
make.76 Zacharias cautions that the “most conspicuous lesson to be
learned is that disciplinary agencies should not be self-satisfied” and
“assume that the status quo is justified simply because they believe their
enforcement decisions to be reasonable.”77 Finally, Zacharias generously
notes that “[p]rofessional regulation is still a young venture,” and that
rules “[d]rafters and disciplinary authorities have much to learn about
their relative roles and responsibilities.”78
70. Id. at 1012–14.
71. Id. at 1016–19.
72. Id. at 1017.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1018. The informational rule can still provide lawyers and regulators
with some sense about the kind of values involved with a guidance standard and the
nature of the choices available to the lawyer. Id. at 1018–19.
75. Id. at 1021.
76. Id. at 1019. Even “pure guidance rules should express the criteria lawyers
must consider and the nature of the decisions that the drafters expect the lawyers to make.”
Id. at 1017. When rules are intended to be enforced to compel or constrain behavior,
then a drafter should make this clear too. Id.
77. Id. at 1019.
78. Id. at 1022. Zacharias’s characterization that “[p]rofessional regulation is still
a young venture” is fair and accurate. Id. It may be a generous characterization too.
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III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NOBODY’S WATCHING
Nobody’s Watching is noteworthy for a number of reasons. First, the
empirical work in the article was part of an ever-growing effort in
professional responsibility and other fields to conduct more empirical
research and writing.79 Zacharias—who often displayed a willingness to
challenge conventional thinking about issues80—was an adventurous
scholar in terms of the substance of his work, his style, and his
methodology.81 Zacharias’s academic boldness is exemplified in his

The bar and the academy had seriously studied for some time some of the regulatory issues
addressed in Nobody’s Watching. See generally Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving
Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L. REV. 702, 704 (1977) (suggesting
that “lawyers’ ethics are consistently self-serving and that pressure for revision of several
basic concepts of professional responsibility is both sound and inevitable”). For
example, the lesson concerning the risk that rules underenforcement poses to public trust
in the lawyer self-regulatory system and the related need for greater transparency in the
regulatory system are not new topics. See AM. BAR ASS’N, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 1–2 (1970) (discussing underenforcement of ethics rules
through the discipline system and the need for recognizing that there is “public
dissatisfaction with the bar and the courts”). The bar’s failure to properly address or
resolve these matters may involve more than the fact that “[p]rofessional regulation is a
new venture.” Zacharias, supra note †, at 1022. For example, another possible reason
for the failure of drafters and disciplinary authorities to appreciate more fully their
respective roles may be the bar’s self-interest in preserving maximum control and
discretion in the marketplace for the delivery of legal services. See William Hornsby,
Clashes of Class and Cash: Battles from the 150 Years War To Govern Client
Development, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 255, 260 (2005) (highlighting the profession’s monopoly
in the delivery of legal services market and stating: “‘We in the law must never forget
that the legal profession has a monopoly in the practice of law, and it is an article of faith
in America that monopolies must be strictly regulated to protect the public interest’”
(quoting Warren E. Berger, Address, The Decline of Professionalism, 137 PROC. AM.
PHIL. SOC’Y 481, 485 (1993))).
79. See ROBERT M. LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 4 (2010); see
also Zaharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes, supra note 41, at 236
n.39 (recognizing the need for more empirical research concerning professional
responsibility issues).
80. See, e.g., Zacharias, A Word of Caution, supra note 5, at 237–38 (recognizing
the benefits of substance abuse programs for lawyers but cautioning that they may be
harmful to clients); Zacharias & Green, Duty To Avoid Wrongful Convictions, supra note
41 (advocating the use of the disciplinary process to encourage prosecutors to use
reasonable care to avoid convicting the innocent); Zacharias, Steroids and Legal Ethics
Codes, supra note 1, at 671.
81. Empirical research requires special training and knowledge. A failure to
obtain such training and to abide by accepted conventions for conducting such research
can result in criticism by academic peers and worse. See generally Nicholas Wade,
Harvard Researcher May Have Fabricated Data in Monkey Study, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28,
2010, at A13 (reporting that a star researcher at Harvard University was on leave because
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empirical study of lawyer advertising violations and the lack of reported
disciplinary cases in Nobody’s Watching. His empirical work in
Nobody’s Watching, published in 2002, occurred before the explosion of
attention to empiricism in United States law schools.82 Empirical
analysis differs from classical legal analysis and requires special effort
and training in techniques for obtaining data.83 Although not endemic to
the field of empirical research, legal scholars undertaking such
nontraditional work recognize the ever-present specter of a misstep and
resulting criticism.84 Zacharias’s empirical work concerning the controversial
topic of lawyer advertising represented a special undertaking for even an
established scholar.

of possible fabrication of data, and noting that “[s]ome forms of scientific error . . . or
even mistaken results are forgivable, but [not] fabrication of data”).
82. See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 79, at 4 (reporting that although empirical
research has been conducted for decades at law schools, the pace has quickened in recent
years, citing a well-attended 2006 empirical conference at the University of Texas in
Austin and similar subsequent conferences). See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Trends
in Legal Scholarship: A Statistical Study, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 517 (2000) (tracking the
trends in legal scholarship that occurred between 1982 and 1996). The authors of
Empirical Methods, the first textbook providing a “synoptic view of empirical methods
in law,” assert “that the changes that have marked the last several decades of legal
education have been bigger and more far-reaching than in the past 130 years.” LAWLESS
ET AL., supra note 79, at 2–3. They claim that there has been “one common aspect [to
these changes]: they involve reaching outside the traditional confines of the law to other
academic disciplines and adopting and adapting techniques from those other disciplines
[economics, philosophy, network theory, and computer science] . . . for the purpose of
studying legal topics.” Id. at 3. The recruitment of faculty with interdisciplinary
backgrounds, sometimes without any legal training, is evidence of the movement to reach
beyond the confines of law to other disciplines. For a recent example of interdisciplinary
scholarship, see Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42
CONN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009), which uses identity theory from social psychology to develop
an explanatory hypothesis for why lawyers in certain situations fail to provide “fully
independent advice to their clients.”
83. See LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 79, at 10. “Legal analysis places a premium
on argumentation and appeals to authority, is frequently geared toward proving a
particular view, is often focused on the particulars of an individual case, and is directed
at reaching a definitive conclusion.” Id. In contrast, empirical research focuses on
observation, the description of patterns of data in the aggregate, the testing of hypotheses,
and “is a continuing enterprise in which new work builds on that which came before and
generates even more questions for further investigation.” Id.
84. See id. Lawless and his coauthors describe the empirical approach as a
“rigorous approach” involving a host of complexities. Id. at 20. They also caution that
the inappropriate manipulation of data can produce untrustworthy results and criticism.
See id. The rigorous nature of the empirical research and the attending risks of criticism
may provide, in part, an answer to the following quandary of some empirical experts:
“Why legal scholars have sometimes paid so little attention to empirical evidence about
the law is a mystery that we leave to others to solve.” Id. at 21–22; see also JOEL BEST,
DAMNED LIES AND STATISTICS: UNTANGLING NUMBERS FROM THE MEDIA, POLITICIANS,
AND ACTIVISTS 5 (2001) (“Other statistics mutate; they become bad after becoming
mangled (as in the case of the Author’s creative rewording).”).
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Second, Zacharias’s empirical findings revealed a striking gap
between California’s ethical rules governing lawyer advertising and
actual lawyer compliance with these rules when advertising in the
yellow pages. Although it was not surprising that Nobody’s Watching
reported that some lawyers violated the state’s advertising rules, both the
magnitude of the number and the blatant nature of the violations were
unexpected and unsettling. Moreover, Zacharias noted that California’s
experience was not unique. Lawyers nationwide were violating ethical
rules concerning advertising with little consequence.85 It “appear[ed] to
confirm that enforcing advertising rules [was] not a priority anywhere in
the United States.”86
Third, Nobody’s Watching appreciated the interplay of the various
internal and external forces affecting the decision to take disciplinary
action. Regulators of lawyer conduct in the United States and abroad
have broad discretion to initiate disciplinary charges.87 Their decision to
enforce or not enforce rules takes into consideration a variety factors,
“including the economic and political climate in which regulators and
lawyers operate at any given time.”88 Zacharias states: “[T]he severity
of the offense, the deterrent effect of prosecution on this and [future]
85. See Zacharias, supra note †, at 988. See generally Johnstone, supra note 40, at
211–18 (providing a general discussion about the involvement of bar associations in the
regulation of professional conduct).
86. Zacharias, supra note †, at 988. Zacharias acknowledges that his survey “is
not definitive” because “[t]he research techniques had limitations.” Id. at 988 & n.81.
He further wrote that “[m]y student researchers and I examined only officially reported
cases that appeared on Westlaw or Lexis and limited ourselves to cases reported in the
relevant topical areas in each state by the computerized data providers.” Id.; see also
Johnstone, supra note 40, at 217 (“The contributions of the major comprehensive bar
associations . . . in drafting and interpreting standards of lawyer professional conduct
have been very creditable. . . . [However,] [t]he associations’ record in enforcing the
standards is less commendable . . . .”).
87. Linda Haller, Professional Discipline for Incompetent Lawyers? Developments
in the UK and Australia, 17 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 83, 85 (2010). This Author has come
to appreciate firsthand the significance of the discretion exercised by disciplinary bodies
as a member of Ohio Legal Ethics and Professional Conduct Committee (OLEPC) since
1994. The OLEPC is one of a number of certified grievance committees in Ohio
authorized to investigate and present cases involving ethical rule violations by lawyers
and judges.
88. Id. Conveniently overlooked at times, the “political climate” affects the creation,
interpretation, and enforcement of ethical rules as well as other aspects of the nation’s
legal system. See A.G. Sulzberger, Voters Moving To Oust Judges Over Decisions, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 2010, at A1 (reporting that the political climate in the fall of 2010
shows that voters want to remove judges, including three Iowa Supreme Court justices,
because they voted in favor of same-sex marriage).
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offenders, the likely cost of prosecution, the nature of the offender, and
the effect of enforcement or lack of enforcement” on the bar’s image, are
all factors in determining whether to discipline a lawyer.89 Any
conclusions regarding enforcement policy or the profession based on the
large number of advertising violations and the few reported advertising
cases should take these factors into account.
Zacharias accounted for these factors at the very beginning of and
throughout Nobody’s Watching. For example, he states: “[A]s a
practical matter, limited resources do prevent disciplinary authorities
from addressing all violations of the professional rules.”90 The topic of
lawyer regulation, combined with the related issues of limited resources
and public trust, is an area of scholarship that still needs much mining if
the profession hopes to respond to consumer demands for greater
professional accountability and access to legal services.91 The bar’s
ability to continue to engage in self-regulation is at stake. The
regulatory system as we once knew it is already unraveling as the
delivery of legal services is being increasingly regulated by interests
outside the profession,92 especially in this era of new technologies and
increasing cross-border practice.93
There is a fourth reason why Nobody’s Watching is noteworthy. It
effectively uses the advertising narrative to focus attention on the
potentially serious “secondary effects” of underenforcing ethical rules
and not just on the “direct” effect of failing to prohibit discrete
conduct—here improper advertising in the yellow pages.94 The
secondary effects are promoting stratification in the bar, diminishing
89. Zacharias, supra note †, at 997 (footnotes omitted); see id. at 997 & nn.118–24.
90. Id. at 974, 997, 1016; see also Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility
Codes, supra note 41, at 225–39 (providing an analysis of various functions of legal
ethics codes).
91. The ABA Commission on Ethics 20/20 was created in 2009 in part to address
these and other issues. See Jack P. Sahl, Foreword: The New Era—Quo Vadis?, 43 U.
AKRON L. REV. 641, 642 & n.3 (2010) (citing Pamela Atkins, ABA Launches New
Initiative To Revamp Lawyer Ethics Rules, 25 ABA/BNA LAWS. MANUAL ON PROF.
CONDUCT 418 (2009)).
92. See John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959 (2009)
(providing a comprehensive discussion of the fragmentation of the rules governing
lawyers); Zacharias, The Myth of Self-Regulation, supra note 1, at 1153 (proposing “an
amendment to the Model Rules that would eliminate all reference to self-regulation and
replace it with a more accurate statement of the status of the professional codes”).
93. Sahl, supra note 91, at 674 (reporting that the increase in domestic and
international multijurisdictional practice and advances in technology are affecting the
profession dramatically, and because of “the ‘high [financial] stakes’ involved in the
international legal services market . . . more lawyers . . . will run the risk of crashing on
the shoals of an increasingly fragmented regulatory framework” (citing Carole Silver,
What We Don’t Know Can Hurt Us: The Need for Empirical Research in Regulating
Lawyers and Legal Services in the Global Economy, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1009 (2010))).
94. Zacharias, supra note †, at 1016.
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lawyer respect for professional regulation, and undermining public trust
in the profession and its ability to self-regulate.95
Bar stratification and its deleterious effects—creating resentment
among lower order lawyers and impeding profession-wide consensus—
have characterized the legal profession for some time.96 Selective
enforcement or nonenforcement of ethics rules leads to bar stratification;
for example, elite lawyers in larger law firms may believe that they are
immunized from any fear of discipline.97
95. Id. For the discussion concerning secondary effects, see infra Part III(A) and
accompanying notes. See also Zacharias, supra note †, at 1005–12 (identifying “the
ramifications” and the various “aspects of underenforcement”).
96. Zacharias, supra note †, at 1007 (internal quotation marks omitted). Zacharias
describes the “lower order” class of lawyers as those lawyers “who ostensibly engage in
unseemly practices (like mass advertising).” Id. at 1006–07. They are viewed with
contempt and are seen as “a breed apart” from elite lawyers. Id. at 1007. Stratification
has been an enduring characteristic of the legal profession. For example, some of the
earliest restrictions on lawyer advertising were aimed, in part, at restricting new entrants
into the marketplace for the delivery of legal services. See Sahl, The Cost of Humanitarian
Assistance, supra note 4, at 831 (stating that advertising “rules appear to have been
created to preserve the profession’s size and demographics and to promote [the]
monopoly on the delivery of legal services” (citing William E. Hornsby, Jr., Ad Rules
Infinitum: The Need for Alternatives to State-Based Ethics Governing Legal Services
Marketing, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 55 (2002)); see also ABA COMM’N ON ADVER.,
LAWYER ADVERTISING AT THE CROSSROADS 32 (1995) (discussing how Lincoln was
“reported to have been ‘an absolute hustler’ as a lawyer who wanted to make money,”
and how “the image of Lincoln as a lawyer was submitted to the Commission on
Advertising both in support of and in opposition to lawyer advertising”); JEROLD S.
AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 50
(1976) (stating that “[t]he ethical crusade that produced the Canons concealed class and
ethnic hostility,” and “Jewish and Catholic new-immigrant lawyers of lower-class origin
were concentrated among the urban solo practitioners whose behavior was unethical
because established Protestant lawyers said it was”); Hornsby, supra note 78, at 292
(asserting that when the original ABA Canons were promulgated, prohibitions on lawyer
advertising “handicapped the lawyer[s]” serving “the urban poor, new immigrants, and
blue-collar workers” while benefitting the “corporate law firms that could leverage the
notions of professionalism and dignity with their corporate clients”). See generally
Claude R. (Chip) Bowles, Jr., et al., Lawyers in a Fee Quandary: Must the Billable Hour
Die?, 6 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 487, 493 (2008) (addressing stratification in the
context of law firm hiring and in the provision of legal services—at the top of the “value
pyramid” is high value or “bet the company work,” and at the bottom of the pyramid is
“commodity work” with “[v]ery few . . . firms . . . willing to admit that a lot of their
work—in virtually all law firms—is in the bottom of the value pyramid”).
97. See Zacharias, supra note †, at 1006–07; see also Amy R. Mashburn,
Professionalism as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L.
REV. 657, 665–67 (1994) (examining “diversity and stratification” in the legal profession,
and arguing that “membership of voluntary bar associations is not representative, and
lawyers from large firms—a minority of American lawyers—dominate committee
membership in those organizations” (footnote omitted)).
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Nonenforcement of the advertising rules will lead some lawyers to
risk violating those rules. This conduct ultimately diminishes respect for
the integrity of the ethical code and the profession. The consequence of
observing others violate rules has been described by legal scholars in
other contexts. In one article, Professor Richard Lavoie writes the
following about violators of the tax code: “While this fact is easily
grasped at a gut level, empirical studies consistently demonstrate that
perceptions about whether others are complying with their tax
obligations strongly impact tax compliance.”98 Relying on the field of
social psychology in another article, Professor Lavoie further notes that
society—and by way of analogy the legal profession—“must develop
moral precepts and a system of laws to serve as situational constraints on
unethical behavior.”99 However, for such restraints to be effective, “the
society’s citizens must identify with, endorse, and respect the relevant
strictures”—society’s and the legal profession’s rules must grow “out of
and reflect the values of the society” and profession.100
Of course, the public is already highly sensitive, if not suspicious,
about the ethical motivations of lawyers.101 Public observance that the
bar is underenforcing its ethical rules may confirm the public’s worst
fears about the profession’s commitment to high ethical standards.
Compounding this suspicion is the concern that some of the profession’s
decisionmaking regarding enforcement is occurring behind closed
doors.102
There is another noteworthy aspect to Nobody’s Watching. Zacharias’s
findings and discussion track some of the work in the field of sociology.

98. Richard Lavoie, Flying Above the Law and Below the Radar: Instilling a Taxpaying
Ethos in Those Playing by Their Own Rules, 29 PACE L. REV. 637, 655–56 (2009).
99. Richard Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law: The Judiciary’s Role in Fostering
Unethical Behavior, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 115, 200 (2004).
100. Id.
101. See William G. Hyland, Jr., Creative Malpractice: The Cinematic Lawyer, 9
TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 231, 236 (2008) (discussing “the precipitous drop in the
public’s perception of the character, prestige and ethics of lawyers that began during the
1970s,” and “trac[ing] the history of lawyer portrayals in film, concentrating on the sharp
negative trial imagery during the 1970s and 1980s that continues to the present”); see
also Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1, 9 (2007) (“The secrecy surrounding the discipline process . . . affects the
general public’s perception of the fairness and legitimacy of the lawyer discipline system
and how well that system actually protects the public.”); Thomas W. Overton, Lawyers,
Light Bulbs, and Dead Snakes: The Lawyer Joke as Societal Text, 42 UCLA L. REV.
1069, 1090 (1995) (reporting that a poll commissioned by the ABA in 1993 to discern
the public perception about lawyers listed the top five complaints against them as: “1)
Too expensive (17%), 2) [g]reedy; money hungry (11%), 3) [n]ot honest; crooks (9%),
4) [t]oo many lawyers (5%), and 5) [s]elf-serving; don’t care about clients (5%)”).
102. See supra notes 63–77 and accompanying text (discussing the need for more
transparency in the drafting, legislating, and enforcing of rules).
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Sociologists have long studied the ideology and rise of professions.103
Their work provides a valuable interdisciplinary perspective on the role
and significance of professions in the nation’s social and economic
structure.104
Sociological insights about the dynamics of professional behavior
provide a rich basis for improving both the operation and regulation of
the legal profession. Sociologists argue that there are two hallmarks to a
profession, including the legal profession: first, education or professional
training, and second, an ethical code that manifests a higher calling to
act in the public’s interest—to aspire beyond one’s own personal
interests.105 “The professional maintains his neutrality against encroachment

103. See TALCOTT PARSONS, The Professions and Social Structure, in ESSAYS IN
SOCIOLOGICAL T HEORY 34, 34 (rev. ed. 1954) (“Comparative study of the social
structures of the most important civilizations shows that the professions occupy a position of
importance in our society which is, in any comparable degree of development, unique in
history.”).
104. See MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS xviii (1977) (noting that “[t]he persistence of profession as a category of social
practice suggests that the . . . movements of professionalization [have] become an ideology—
not only an image which consciously inspires collective or individual efforts, but a
mystification which unconsciously obscures real social structures and relations,” and
“exploring [the] passage” of the profession from a “predominantly economic function—
organizing the linkage between education and the marketplace—to a predominantly
ideological one—justifying inequality of status and closure of access in the occupational
order”). See generally PARSONS, supra note 103, at 34–49. Parsons writes:
The importance of the professions to social structure may be summed up as
follows: The professional type is the institutional framework in which many of
our most important social functions are carried on, notably the pursuit of
science and liberal learning and its practical application in medicine, technology,
law and teaching. This depends on an institutional structure the maintenance of
which is not an automatic consequence of belief in the importance of the functions
as such, but involves a complex balance of diverse social forces.
Id. at 48, quoted in LARSON, supra at xii. The forces at play in maintaining a profession
include the members’ interest in earning income, maintaining a monopoly for the
delivery of their services, and maximizing their independence in how they perform their
service. See LARSON, supra at x–xviii.
105. See LARSON, supra note 104, at 40–52 (examining the standardization of
knowledge and market control and contending that “professional markets are radically
different from those in the laissez-faire commodity markets; in the latter, caveat emptor
is the rule, while in the former, professional work ethics and the ideal of service justify
consumer’s trust”). Philip Elliott stated that:
The ideology of liberal education, public service and gentlemanly professionalism
was elaborated in opposition to the growth of industrialism and commercialism. . . .
It incorporated such values as personal service, a dislike of competition,
advertising and profit, a belief in the principle of payment in order to work
rather than working for pay and in the superiority of the motive of service.
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by insisting as a fundamental proposition that his motivation is altruistic.”106
The legal profession’s autonomy to control the creation, development,
and regulation of these two hallmarks of the law field is critical to the
profession’s dominance in the market for the delivery of legal services
and its ability to engage in self-regulation.
Zacharias’s empirical work and detailed analysis in Nobody’s Watching
addresses the workings and the legitimacy of the legal profession’s selfregulatory status. The profession’s self-regulatory status ultimately rests
upon the public’s faith in the profession’s ability to establish and enforce
high ethical standards.107 One prominent sociologist raises many of the
concerns touched upon by Zacharias:
Self-regulation . . . is not a simple matter. Aside from the circumstance that
standards must be established and codes adopted, a professional body is not a
universal mutual-policing organization. . . . When an organized association
becomes involved, not all members will be equally concerned about standards
of competence and performance; some will benefit by being off-grade. Codes
of conduct may be promulgated by a minority, and accepted with less than total
enthusiasm by the relevant electorate; by some, the acceptance may be tactical
or cynical, designed to assuage the anxieties of dubious clients or professed for

These values closely resemble many of the characteristic which later commentators
and sociologists have taken to be the defining characteristics of professions.
PHILIP ELLIOTT, THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS 52–53 (1972); see also, ELIOT
FREIDSON, PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF MEDICAL CARE 96
(1970). In discussing Talcott Parsons’s definition of the term professional, Freidson writes:
[S]omeone who is supposed to be recruited and licensed on the basis of his
technical competence rather than his ascribed social characteristics, to use
generally accepted rather than particularistic scientific standard in his work, to
restrict his work activity to areas in which he is technically competent, to avoid
emotional involvement and to cultivate objectivity in his own work, and to put
his client’s interests before his own. These normative expectations are intended by
Parsons to apply to all professions, not only to medicine, since he treats the
medical practitioner as the archetype of the professional.
Id. See generally William E. Hornsby, Jr., Ad Rules Infinitum: The Need for Alternatives
to State-Based Ethics Governing Legal Services Marketing, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 53–
54 (2002) (reporting that in the latter part of the nineteenth century the legal profession
created a system of formal education—a bar examination to test competence—and a
system of ethics and discipline “to limit its ranks and secure its position as a monopoly in
America”).
106. JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE TYRANNY OF THE EXPERTS: HOW PROFESSIONALS
ARE CLOSING THE OPEN SOCIETY 57 (1970) (“He professes a desire to serve all and to
serve to the maximum of his ability, regardless of the size of his compensation or other
material reward. . . . Of course, the professional can say this without believing it, but it
is important that he act on it.”); see ROBERT K. MERTON, SOME THOUGHTS ON THE
PROFESSIONS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 11 (1960) (“[T]he social invention of the professions
institutionalizes altruistic behavior.”).
107. Zacharias, supra note †, at 1008–09 (commenting that the “very notion of selfregulation of the bar” is called into question when the public learns about the profession
not enforcing its “advertising prohibitions . . . perhaps from elite lawyers distinguishing
themselves from the ‘lower strata’ of the profession”).

468

[VOL. 48: 447, 2011]

Behind Closed Doors
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

the benefit of prestigious brethren with the full intention of pursuing a “practical,”
less-than-ideal course of action.108

No matter what reason underlies the creation of a professional code of
ethical conduct, Zacharias and his counterparts in the sociology of the
professions field agree that public trust is the lynchpin to self-regulation
and market control.109 The public clamor for lawyers to be accountable
to authority external to the profession may ultimately limit their
professional independence and market domination of the delivery of
legal services.110

108. WILBERT E. MOORE, THE PROFESSIONS: ROLES AND RULES 127 (1970) (footnote
omitted); see also Zacharias, supra note †, at 1008–09 (cautioning that “[a]n uninformed
observer might reasonably assume that the bar does not enforce its rules, preferring to
protect the economic interests of lawyers instead”).
109. See Neil Hamilton, Assessing Professionalism: Measuring Progress in the
Formation of an Ethical Professional Identity, 5 U. SAINT THOMAS L.J. 470, 492 (2008)
(“If members of a peer-review profession seek self-advantage to the same degree as
individuals in other occupations, then society has no reason to grant the profession
authority to regulate itself, and society would rely on the competitive market’s control of
work by management.” (footnote omitted)); see also Gail B. Agrawal & Mark A. Hall,
What if You Could Sue Your HMO? Managed Care Liability Beyond the ERISA Shield,
47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 235, 291–92 (2003) (discussing regulation in the context of the
medical field). Agrawal and Hall observe:
Reliance on professional custom and self-regulation is based on public trust
that the self-regulating profession will set high standards and that the risk of
professional sanction will cause individuals to comply voluntarily with
professional norms to avoid social sanction. The managed care industry is not
afforded the degree of public or individual trust that characterizes the medical
profession. Bureaucracy does not engender a sense of public confidence or
individual trust. The individually unidentifiable corporate constituents that determine
corporate conduct have less to fear from individual social sanction than to
personal physicians and, therefore, are likely to be less motivated by these
psychological and reputational forces.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
110. See Judith L. Maute, Bar Associations, Self-Regulation and Consumer
Protection: Whither Thou Goest?, 2008 PROF. LAW. 53, 65–66 (cautioning that “[i]f we
lawyers in the U.S. do not get our houses in order, we may find that others will wrest
control from us, creating powerful external regulatory structures over which we have
little control”); see also Zacharias, supra note †, at 1009 (suggesting another possible
limitation on the ability of lawyers to deliver legal services: that “[a]ctual clients may be
less willing to believe in or honor the rules when receiving their lawyers’ advice” (citing
Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1303, 1362–63 (1995) (discussing the impact of rules in reinforcing the lawyer’s
ability to resist client misperceptions about proper lawyer conduct))).
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A. Nobody’s Watching—Casting a Long Shadow in
Lawyer Regulation
The relevancy and importance of Nobody’s Watching continues today.
Its message about the risks involved with the nonenforcement or
underenforcement of ethics rules is reflected in contemporary scholarly
and nonscholarly articles.111 For example, Professor Margaret Raymond
recently examined the failure of states to enforce their advertising rules
against out-of-state lawyers whose advertisements violate a state’s
rules.112 She relies, in part, on some of Zacharias’s work in Nobody’s
Watching and notes that there are several problems with the
nonenforcement or underenforcement of advertising rules. It “reduces
respect for [the] law”113—a key point advanced by Zacharias.114
Underenforcement also “undermines any goal of shielding the consumer
from misleading communications or communications that undermine the
observer’s respect . . . for lawyers and the legal profession”—concerns
also raised in Nobody’s Watching.115 Raymond further argues that

111. See, e.g., Margaret Raymond, Inside, Outside: Cross-Border Enforcement of
Attorney Advertising Restrictions, 43 AKRON L. REV. 801, 801 (2010) (addressing the
“puzzling” problem of cross-border enforcement—or the lack of it—of attorney advertising
regulations); Frank Davies, Congress’ Ethics Rules Showing Few Teeth, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (Apr. 23, 2006), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2006-04-23/news/HARRIS23
_1_ethics-ornstein-harris (noting that a decline in public trust of Congress in the mid1990s led to tough ethics rules that were being ignored because “the rules are rarely
enforced”); R. Jeffrey Smith, For Judges, Inconsistent Use of Ethics Rules Is Evident,
WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2010, at A10 (reporting about Douglas Kendall, head of the
Constitutional Accountability Center, who questions a “judicial ethics process that is
‘completely self-policing and unenforceable’” and allows judges to “‘violate [a code of
conduct] with impunity.’”). Professor Raymond incorporates some of Zacharias’s work
in Nobody’s Watching and his article, Zacharias, Federalizing Legal Ethics, supra note 1,
in Inside, Outside. See Raymond, supra at 813 & n.53, 815 & n.60, 821 & n.84.
Professor Raymond concludes: “[I]t is not surprising that states do little cross-border
enforcement of advertising rules” in light of Zacharias’s “scholarly work suggesting that
states do little enforcement of advertising rules even against in-state lawyers.”
Raymond, supra at 821 & n.84 (citing Zacharias, supra note †, at 999); see Michael R.
McCunney & Alyssa A. DiRusso, Marketing Wills, 16 ELDER L.J. 33, 35 (2008)
(positing “that one reason for the disappointing number of individuals who execute wills
is a wholesale failure of the legal industry to effectively market them”). McCunney and
DiRusso cite to Zacharias and Nobody’s Watching to show that some scholars “have
argued that despite the appearance of a strict rule on lawyer advertising, the level of
activity that is actually tolerated is quite high.” Id. at 70 (citing Zacharias, supra note †,
at 988); see also Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of
the Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 465 (2008) (noting that “enforcement of the
Rules of Professional Conduct has been notoriously lax” (citing Zacharias, supra note
†)).
112. Raymond, supra note 111, at 803.
113. Id. at 822.
114. Zacharias, supra note †, at 1005–06.
115. Raymond, supra note 111, at 822.
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underenforcement also “disadvantages in-state lawyers” who may feel
“some pressure to comply” with a state’s advertising rules while out-ofstate lawyers are free to ignore such rules in competing for a larger share
of the legal services market.116
The relevance of Nobody’s Watching was also poignantly illustrated
by a recent American Bar Association (ABA) article discussing legal
services outsourcing and the fly in, fly out rule (FIFO).117 Both topics
arose in the context of a public hearing by the ABA Commission on
Ethics 20/20. Peter Ehrenhaft of Washington, D.C., has practiced
transactional law for almost fifty years and speculated that there are
several hundred lawyers like him doing FIFO work around the world.
The article, quoting Ehrenhaft, reported:
“Not once during [my 50 years] has any question been raised by any regulatory
body overseeing the delivery of legal services in this country or overseas about
either my services or those of counsel” working on my side or on the opposite
side of the table.
That is true despite the fact “none of the ‘foreign’ lawyers in the room (either
I or another) had in, any way, been authorized to provide such services in the
jurisdiction in which we were working.”118

116. Id. at 822–23.
117. See Legal Process Outsourcing and “Fly In/Fly Out” Lawyering Addressed at
Ethics 20/20 Commission Hearing in San Francisco, ABA NOW (Aug. 8, 2010),
http://www.abanow.org/2010/08/legal-process-outsourcing-and-%E2%80%98flyinfly-out%E2%80%99-lawyering-addressed-at-ethics-2020-commission-hearingin-san-francisco.
118. Id. Ehrenhaft then “cite[s] the example of a meeting at the Amsterdam Airport
between the CEOs of a Swiss firm and the Italian client he represented, during which the
Italian client’s acquisition of a division of the Swiss company operating in Germany was
discussed.” Id. “The terms ‘fly-in, fly-out’ and ‘FIFO’ are sometimes used to refer to
temporary practice by a lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction in which the lawyer is not
admitted.” Laurel S. Terry et al., Transnational Legal Practice 2009, 44 INT’L LAW. 563,
576 n.87 (2010). The ABA Model Rule for Temporary Practice by Foreign Lawyers states:
[A] lawyer does not engage in the unauthorized practice of law . . . when on a
temporary basis the lawyer performs services in this jurisdiction that:
(1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice
in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter;
(2) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a
tribunal held or to be held in a jurisdiction outside the United States
if the lawyer, or a person the lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law
or by order of the tribunal to appear in such proceeding or reasonably
expects to be so authorized;
(3) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration,
mediation or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding held or
to be held in this or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or
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Ehrenhaft’s comments suggest that lawyers are providing legal
services in jurisdictions where they are not licensed—essentially
engaging in the unauthorized practice of law (UPL).119 The three
conclusions drawn by the young lawyer in Nobody’s Watching concerning
the few reported cases for violations of California’s advertising rules are
instructive in considering the conduct of lawyers who engage in
transnational legal work in jurisdictions where they are not licensed.

are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in
which the lawyer is admitted to practice;
(4) are not within paragraphs (2) or (3) and
(i) are performed for a client who resides or has an office in a
jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to practice to the
extent of that authorization; or
(ii) arise out of or are reasonably related to a matter that has a substantial
connection to a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is authorized to
practice to the extent of that authorization; or
(5) are governed primarily by international law or the law of a nonUnited States jurisdiction.
AM. BAR ASS’N, CLIENT REPRESENTATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION ON MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE 67 (2002).
119. Under the ABA Model Rules:
(a) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation
of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so.
(b) A lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction shall not:
(1) except as authorized by these Rules or other law, establish an office
or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for
the practice of law; or
(2) hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted
to practice law in this jurisdiction.
(c) A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred
or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services
on a temporary basis in the jurisdiction that:
(1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice
in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter;
(2) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a
tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the lawyer, or a person the
lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such
proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized;
(3) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration,
mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this
or another jurisdiction, if the services arise out of or are reasonably
related to the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer
is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum
requires pro hac vice admission; or
(4) are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3) and arise out of or are
reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which
the lawyer is admitted to practice.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(a)–(c) (2010). The ABA created the Ethics
20/20 Commission in part in response to the increase in multijurisdictional practice in
order to “better educate lawyers about developments involving the globalization of the
legal services market and their ethical significance.” Sahl, supra note 91, at 674.
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First, the rules regarding multijurisdictional work do not mean what they
say.120 Second, the rules mean what they say but are not enforceable.121
Third, the multijurisdictional rules mean what they say and are
enforceable, but the bar does not “deem violations important enough to
prompt disciplinary action.”122
An in-depth discussion of UPL is beyond the scope of this Article, but
the third conclusion raised by Zacharias’s young lawyer regarding the
violation of advertising rules arguably applies to the UPL problem raised
by Eherenhaft. Although there may be some gray area regarding what
constitutes UPL, UPL rules are analogous to advertising rules because
they are sufficiently clear to prohibit the type of cross-border legal work
that Ehrenhaft discussed at the recent 20/20 hearing.123 If the UPL rule
means what it says and is capable of enforcement, the question then
becomes: why have the regulators of the delivery of legal services
elected not to enforce the rule? This may be because regulators believe
the ethical standards are wrong or unrealistic, or simply because the bar
decided against enforcement for other reasons, including inadequate
enforcement resources.
The same consequences of intentional underenforcement discussed by
Zacharias in Nobody’s Watching arguably apply here in the UPL context.
For example, the underenforcement of UPL rules may encourage other
lawyers to violate the rules and raise broader questions about the efficacy
or integrity of the regulatory process.124 One expert in economic sociology
notes that social reinforcement of behavior “may be more important [for

120.
121.
122.
123.
(a)

Zacharias, supra note †, at 974.
Id.
Id.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5. Model Rule 5.5 states:
A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in violation of the regulation
of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist another in doing so.
(b) A lawyer who is not admitted to practice in this jurisdiction shall not:
(1) except as authorized by these Rules or other law, establish an office
or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction for
the practice of law; or
(2) hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted
to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Id.; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1291 (9th ed. 2009) (defining the “unauthorized
practice of law” as “[t]he practice of law by a person, typically a nonlawyer, who has not
been licensed or admitted to practice law in a given jurisdiction”).
124. See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text.
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promoting conduct] than who is encouraging them.”125 Thus, if there are
numerous lawyers freely violating the profession’s UPL rules, then it is
likely that other lawyers will also violate those rules. This cascading
dynamic is problematic for the lawyer regulatory system, which is
already grappling with the issues of limited resources and the public and
bar’s negative perceptions of lawyer self-regulation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Nobody’s Watching provides an insightful discussion concerning the
development and enforcement of the profession’s rules of ethical
conduct. Zacharias offers academics, practitioners, and regulators a
helpful roadmap for avoiding some of the adverse consequences
associated with the underenforcement of ethics rules and for improving
the lawyer regulatory system.
Scholars in organizational studies divide leaders into two categories:
transactional and transformational.126 Transactional leaders are “evenkeeled managers . . . who know how to delegate, listen and set achievable
goals.”127 Transformational leaders, on the other hand, are “entrepreneurs [or
persons] [who] must recruit and galvanize when a company is little more
than a whisper of a big idea. Shouting ‘To the ramparts!’ with no
ramparts in sight takes a kind of irrational self-confidence.”128
Zacharias was a transformational scholar in the legal profession field
as evidenced, in part, by Nobody’s Watching. He was “[s]houting
[sometimes] ‘To the ramparts!’”—discovering and highlighting
problems and calling for reforms in our profession or the legal system
when no one else was doing it—when there were “no ramparts in
sight.”129 This kind of leadership takes a special kind of self-confidence,
energy, and commitment to the profession that ensures Zacharias’s longlasting legacy in the academy and the profession.130 To be sure,
Zacharias’s intellectual and moral presence will be missed.

125. Natasha Singer, Better Health, with a Little Help from Our Friends, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 2010, at BU3.
126. David Segal, Just Manic Enough: Seeking the Perfect Entrepreneur, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 2010, at BU1 (discussing traits of important leaders and recognizing that
entrepreneurs require a special trait).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See id.
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